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A WAR ON DRUGS OR A WAR ON IMMIGRANTS?
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF "DRUG TRAFFICKING"






In this Article we assess competing interpretations of the Immigration
and Nationality Act's aggravated felony provisions, specifically the
determination of what state drug offenses properly constitute aggra-
vated felonies, thus subjecting noncitizens to deleterious collateral im-
migration consequences, including deportation. This issue is
considered within the broader political and social context of the na-
tion's "war on drugs" and wide-ranging trends in American immi-
gration policy. We argue that state drug offenses should be
analogous to the traditional ftderal characterizations of a felony
(i.e., yielding more than a year of imprisonment) in order to be ap-
propriately considered aggravated felonies. We conclude that inter-
pretations of the aggravated felony provisions that allow offenses
falling below this threshold to be considered aggravated felonies are
misguided, lead to unwarranted collateral immigration consequences
for noncitizens, and fit within a broader pattern of inordinate bur-
den sharing by historically disempowered groups in the war on
drugs.
INTRODUCTION
While Richard Nixon was the first President to employ the phrase
"war on drugs,"' the phrase is most commonly associated with the
politics and policies that emanated from the administrations of Presi-
dents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and continue to domi-
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*** Chester H. Smith Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.
1. See ERICH GOODE, BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE
58 (1997).
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nate U.S. crime policy.2 Exemplifying this political crusade were the
remarks of President Bush at a 1990 anti-drug rally:
To win the war on drugs, we must have a united effort. This
isn't Republican or Democrat or liberal or conservative: it's
got to be bipartisan. But now, it's time for Congress to act.
Our children, our communities, and our cops have waited
long enough.3
However, the war on drugs campaign was not merely one of rhetoric,
as both federal and state enforcement priorities and policies were ad-
justed to focus on narcotics infractions.4
At about this same period of time, the nation experienced an es-
calation in public concern over perceived developments in American
immigration, most notably the perception that immigrant criminal in-
volvement was rampant and posed a significant threat to the public's
well-being.5 Congress responded to these concerns by taking unprec-
edented steps toward revising immigration laws to deal with criminal
aliens.6 While this legislation dealt with a myriad of concerns, particu-
larly prominent in these revisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)7 were provisions designed to combat drug trafficking
through the development of a new category of criminal alien, the "ag-
gravated felon."' Congressional initiatives in 1988 amended the INA
to place aliens convicted of certain drug offenses alongside those con-
victed of murder, in the newly created category of aggravated felons, a
novel classification that provided an entirely distinctive basis for im-
posing immigration-based disabilities, including deportation, under
the INA for noncitizens convicted of drug offenses.9 Not too long
2. See Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance: Presiden-
tial Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65J. POL. 995, 998 (2003) (discussing specific drug control
measures taken by both the Reagan and Bush administrations).
3. George Bush, Remarks at an Antidrug Rally in Billings, Montana July 20, 1990), in
2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH 1990, at 1036,
1038 (1991).
4. See generally OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRES-
IDENT OF THE U.S., THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, 1996: PROGRAM RESOURCES
AND EVALUATION (1996); Marc Maur, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the
United States, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 9, 11 (2001).
5. Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises
of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 367, 425-27 (1999).
6. Id. at 424-31.
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
8. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 7342-7344, 102 Stat. 4181,
4469-71 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43), 1252(a)); Craig H. Feldman,
Note, The Immigration Act of 1990: Congress Continues to Aggravate the Criminal Alien, 17 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 205-06 (1993).
9. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §§ 7342-7344, 102 Stat. at 4469-71.
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thereafter, the Immigration Act of 199010 greatly expanded the num-
ber of crimes that were considered to be aggravated felonies" and,
with regard to drug trafficking offenses, made clear Congress's posi-
tion that the aggravated felony provisions applied to those convicted
of either federal or state drug offenses.
1 2
It is within the political and historical context of the federal gov-
ernment's colossal campaign against drugs and its renewed fervor in
immigration regulation that a noncitizen might find himself in severe
trouble for a relatively minor narcotics infraction, depending upon
10. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
11. Id. § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). Sec-
tion 501 (a) (3) of the 1990 amendments expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" to
include "any crime of violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, which includes an offense that
"has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another," or any felony that "involves a substantial risk that physical
force" will be used against the property or person of another. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). The
1990 amendments also expanded the definition of "aggravated felony" to include crimes
related to money laundering as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and any "illicit trafficking in
any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act),"
which included drug trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2). Immigration Act of 1990,
§ 501 (a) (2)-(3), 104 Stat. at 5048.
In 1994, the INA definition of "aggravated felony" was further amended under the
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). This Act
added illicit trafficking in firearms or explosives, certain theft or burglary offenses, receipt
of stolen property, kidnapping for ransom, child pornography, racketeering crimes, prosti-
tution crimes, espionage, treason, tax fraud or evasion, alien smuggling, certain types of
document fraud, and failure of a defendant to appear to serve a sentence. ld.; Julie Anne
Rah, Note, The Removal of Aliens Who Drink and Drive: Felony DWI as a Crime of Violence Under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 70 FoRiuiam L. REv. 2109, 2118 n.63 (2002).
In 1996, the INA was amended through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (relevant portions codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)
(relevant portions codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The AEDPA amended the
definition of "aggravated felony" to include commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery,
trafficking in stolen vehicles, obstruction of justice, perjury, bribery of a witness, con-
ducting an illegal gambling business, transporting for the purpose of prostitution, failure
to appear in court for certain felony charges, and certain offenses committed by a previ-
ously deported alien. AEDPA, § 440(e), 110 Stat. at 1277-78 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43)). The IIRIRA expanded the aggravated felony category to include
rape and sexual abuse of a minor. IIRIRA, § 321 (a) (1), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 to 3009-628
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). See Rah, supra, at 2118 n.66.
12. Immigration Act of 1990, § 501 (a) (5), 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). The term "drug trafficking" in INA § 1101(a) (43) (B) is defined
through incorporation of the language provided in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2), which defines a
"drug trafficking crime" as "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et
seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)." 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) (2000).
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his circumstances. Under the INA's aggravated felony provisions, an
immigrant might be deported by virtue of being convicted of an of-
fense that would not, in fact, be considered a felony under federal law.
While felonies under federal law are traditionally understood as of-
fenses that are punishable by more than a year in prison, 13 some states
rather arbitrarily label minor possession offenses as felonies, even
though these infractions typically are punishable by a sentence requir-
ing less than a year's imprisonment.
For instance, consider the relative predicaments of two nonci-
tizens under the aggravated felony provisions, each convicted of mi-
nor drug possession offenses-one in North Dakota, and one in
Montana.14 While neither offense would constitute a felony or subject
a noncitizen to deportation under federal law, the first noncitizen
could be deported because simple possession of thirty grams or less of
marijuana is punishable as a felony in North Dakota, whereas the sec-
ond noncitizen would not face deportation for the same offense in
Montana because such a possession charge is only punishable as a mis-
demeanor.15 This confusing and disconcerting state of affairs has
evolved due to a tenuous reading of the INA's aggravated felony provi-
sions by a number of circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, in
which an expansive definition of the term "felony" has been adopted.
This view holds that for purposes of determining aggravated felony
status under INA § 1101 (a) (43), "felony" means all offenses labeled or
classified by states as felonies, whether they are analogous to tradi-
tional understandings of what constitutes a felony under federal law
or not.
In this Article, we assess competing interpretations of the INA's
aggravated felony provisions pertaining to drug trafficking by the re-
spective United States courts of appeals and the Board of Immigration
Appeals. We also consider the placement of this debate within the
larger political context of the war on drugs and American immigra-
tion policymaking. In Part I, we examine the political backdrop to the
immediate debate over the proper interpretation of the INA aggra-
vated felony drug trafficking provisions by evaluating the broader pol-
icy implications of the government's war on drugs for minorities and
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2000) (classifying criminal offenses as felonies if the au-
thorized imprisonment is more than one year); see also infta note 144 and accompanying
text (noting federal courts' recognition of Congress's definition of a felony being a crime
punishable by more than one year).
14. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2002).
15. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(6) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-
102(2) (2001)).
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immigrants. In Part II, we examine the history and development of
the laws relating to the current discord over the INA's drug-related
aggravated felony rules. We then discuss the three primary competing
theories concerning what offenses appropriately constitute a drug traf-
ficking felony under the aggravated felony rules and argue that state
felony offenses should be analogous to their federal felony counter-
parts in order to subject noncitizens to the immigration disabilities
associated with aggravated felony status. In Part III, we suggest that
interpretations of the aggravated felony provisions that allow offenses
falling below this threshold to be considered aggravated felonies are
misguided and lead to unwarranted collateral immigration conse-
quences for noncitizens. Finally, we conclude that this development
fits within a larger pattern of inordinate burden sharing in the war on
drugs by historically disempowered groups.
I. THE WAR ON DRUGS AS A WAR OF POLITICS AND INEQUITIES
The economic costs of the war on drugs are staggering. One esti-
mate of the war's fiscal burden indicates that the effort exacts more
than $75 billion a year from the public coffers and another $70 billion
a year from consumers.16 This expense is exacerbated by the rising
costs of incarcerating those caught in the net of the war on drugs, as
imprisonment rates have skyrocketed in recent decades due in large
part to the war on drugs.1 7 For example, the percent of the federal
prison population incarcerated for drug offenses (as opposed to all
other offenses) rose dramatically during the height of the war on
drugs, from 24.9% in 1980 to 59.5% in 1992.18 Another way of consid-
ering the impact of the war on drugs on prison populations is to ex-
amine the prison population in relation to the number of "index"
crimes (serious, nondrug crimes). In 1980, the rate of state and fed-
16. Charles H. Whitebread, "Us" and "Them" and the Nature of Moral Regulation, 74 S.
CAL. L. REv. 361, 368 (2000) (citing William F. Buckley, Statement to the New York Bar
Association (Summer 1995), in NAT'L REv., The War on Drugs Is Lost, Feb. 12, 1996, at 34,
35).
17. E.g., Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral Damage": No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL.
L. RFv. 1027, 1031 (2002).
18. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUS-
TICE STATISTIcS-2000, at 526 tbl.6.51 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001)
[hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK]. Certainly, the increase in incarceration per serious crime
might represent more than just drug-based imprisonment (e.g., harsher sentences for seri-
ous crimes); however, coupled with what we know about federal imprisonment rates for
drug offenses, it provides an interesting insight into the relationship between serious crime
and incarceration trends over time.
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eral prisoners per 1000 index crimes was 23.19 In 1990, it was 49, and
in 1998, it was 94.20 Given the operating costs of holding a prisoner,
estimated at between $20,000 to $30,000 per year, along with the ex-
penditures incurred in building new prison facilities, the war on drugs
has proven to be a very costly method for politicians to prove to voters
that they are serious about public safety.2 1
A. Disparate Enforcement for Immigrants and Minorities
The monetary costs of the war on drugs pale in comparison to the
nonfinancial toll of the drug crusade, specifically the confinement of
thousands of people and the detrimental consequences of this govern-
ment action on affected families and communities.2 2 It is these costs
that are inequitably borne by minorities and immigrants. For exam-
ple, while African Americans represent approximately 12.8% of the
population, they constituted 35.2% of all persons charged on drug
abuse offenses in 1999.21 Moreover, in 2000, more African American
federal prisoners were incarcerated for drug violations than for all
other crimes committed by African Americans combined (64.4% of
African American male federal prisoners and 66.3% of African Ameri-
can female federal prisoners). 24 These disparities in enforcement and
imprisonment persist despite the fact that studies indicate that, gener-
ally, minorities are no more likely to abuse narcotics than nonminori-
ties and are less apt to abuse certain drugs than whites.25
Noncitizens have also emerged as a target in the war on drugs. In
1997, drug offenses were the foremost bases for criminal removal by
the INS, leading to more removals than all other categories of crimes
combined. 6 In the broader war on crime, the INS greatly expanded
19. Id. at 523 tbl.6.46. "Index crimes include the violent crimes of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and the property
crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft." Id.
20. Id.
21. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82
(1995).
22. John Hagan & Juleigh Petty Coleman, Returning Captives of the American War on
Drugs: Issues of Community and Family Reentry, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 352 (2001); see also
Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug
Crises, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 101-02 (arguing that long, mandatory sentences for nonvi-
olent crimes destabilize the communities in which the incarcerated formerly lived).
23. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 18, at 366 tbl.4.10.
24. Id. at 526 tbl.6.50.
25. TONRY, supra note 21, at 108-10; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 262-66 (2002).
26. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 167 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
INS YEARBOOK]. Other offenses that serve as common bases for deportation are immigra-
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its net of deportation during the Reagan-Bush era, with the number of
aliens deported for criminal or narcotics convictions jumping from
310 in 1981 to 8,183 in 1990.27 By 1997, over fifty thousand convicted
aliens were removed, with 61% of these removals based on aggravated
felonies.28 In the federal courts, approximately one-third of all drug
offenses involve noncitizens, while noncitizens account for only one-
tenth of all other types of offenses. 29 There is also reason to believe
that immigrants face disparate treatment further along in the criminal
justice process. A study of incarceration outcomes in drug offense
cases demonstrated that, while statistically controlling for a litany of
alternative explanatory factors, a defendant's status as a noncitizen sig-
nificantly increased his length of imprisonment. 3° Such unequal en-
forcement and adjudication of drug offenses is especially problematic
for immigrants because, unlike violent crimes or white-collar offenses,
drug crimes are inordinately associated with numerous and severe col-
lateral sanctions,31 such as immigration disabilities and occupational
restrictions, which can undermine a noncitizen's ability to remain in
the country or reintegrate into his community when released.
B. Assaying the Costs and Benefits of the War
The economic and social costs of the war on drugs bring to bear
the question of what has been gained in the crusade. While propo-
nents of the war might point to statistics evincing a downward trend in
the use of some narcotics in the 1980s and early 1990s, Michael Tonry
makes a persuasive case that such changes in use were part of a long-
term downward trend in drug usage that preceded the drug war ef-
forts. 2 His analysis of data from time-series studies indicates that re-
ported drug usage reached an all-time high in the late seventies and
was already on a downward trend when the policies and rhetoric of
the war on drugs began several years after Ronald Reagan took office
tion offenses, burglary, assault, weapons offenses, robbery, larceny, stolen vehicle offenses,
sexual assault, and forgery. Id
27. Id. at 187 tbl.68. The INS definition of which aliens count as criminal aliens
changed in 1990, making comparisons after that year problematic. Id. Proportionally,
aliens deported on criminal or narcotics grounds were approximately 1.9% of all removals
in 1981 and 31.1% of all removals in 1990. See id.
28. Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration
of Immigrants, in ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION 351, 368 (GeorgeJ. Borjas ed.,
2000).
29. Demleitner, supra note 17, at 1043 (citing Stephen Demuth, The Effect of Citizenship
Status on Sentencing Outcomes in Drug Cases, 14 FED. SENTENCING REP. 271, 272 (2002)).
30. Butcher & Piehl, supra note 28, at 370-78.
31. Chin, supra note 25, at 259-62.
32. TONRY, supra note 21, at 83-91.
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as President.33 Certainly, public opinion on drug usage changed dur-
ing this time frame. One national level time-series survey indicates
that in 1978, 30% of respondents felt that marijuana should be legal-
ized, whereas only 16% of respondents in 1990 favored legalization.34
Similar time-series studies reveal an increase in respondents' percep-
tions of the harmfulness of drug use over a similar time frame.35 How-
ever, it is not entirely clear if these trends in the public's view towards
drug use were a product of cyclical patterns in public attitudes towards
vices generally36 or politicians' entrepreneurial activities. Given the
aforementioned downward turn in drug usage during this period of
time, it is highly unlikely that this swell in public opinion was an au-
thentic response to reported trends in narcotics use.
Beckett and Sasson suggest that the war on drugs is largely a
product of political manipulation of the policy agenda by conserva-
tives, asserting:
Conservative politicians have worked for decades to alter
popular perceptions of problems such as crime, delin-
quency, addiction, and poverty and to promote policies that
involve "getting tough" and "cracking down." Their claims-
making activities have been part of a larger effort both to
realign the electorate and to define social control rather
than social welfare as the primary responsibility of the state.38
However, the crime and drug control agenda has evolved into a cam-
paign that enjoys the support of both Republicans and Democrats, as
33. Id.
34. BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUS-
TICE STATISTICS-1993, at 214 tbl.2.71 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994)
[hereinafter 1993 SOURCEBOOK].
35. Id. at 227 tbl.2.89. The survey of high school seniors revealed that in 1981 only
19.1% perceived that smoking marijuana occasionally put one at great risk, whereas in
1991 more than 40% of respondents felt that such behavior put one at great risk. Id.
Analysis of Gallup Poll results indicates an upward trend in the public's perception of drug
usage as the nation's most important problem. In 1985, only 2% of respondents chose it as
the nation's most important problem, but by 1989, 27% of respondents identified it as the
most important problem facing the nation. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 18, at 100
tbl.2.1.
36. See TONRY, supra note 21, at 91-94 (describing the theory of David Musto, a leading
historian of U.S. drug policies, that Americans' tolerance of alcohol and drugs is cyclical).
37. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 52-59 (1997). Beckett argues that, "[i]n sum, there is no evidence of an
upsurge in concern about drugs prior to Reagan's declaration of war. The erroneous iden-
tification of public opinion as the primary impetus for the government's campaigns against
crime and drugs obscures the political nature of those efforts." Id. at 55 (footnote
omitted).
38. KATHERINE BECKETr & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF INJUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 48 (2000). See generally id. at 52-68.
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backing for the war continued and expanded during the Clinton
presidency. 39
Whether the nation has derived a net benefit or not from the war
on drugs will remain a controversial question. However, it is clear that
any progress that has been made on this matter, either for political
gain or in actual policy impact, has been inordinately paid for by mi-
norities, immigrants, and other traditionally disempowered groups.4"
Hence, any beneficial aspects of this policy have come with a "tax"
burden4 ' that has been inequitably levied on those who are the least
able to protect their interests through ordinary political channels.
II. DRUG TRAFFICKING AS AN AGGRAVATED FELONY UNDER THE INA
Since its overhaul in 1952, the INA had received only intermittent
review and revision by Congress until the 1980s.4 2 Prior to this time,
the Act's primary criminal provisions involved specific drug offenses
and crimes involving moral turpitude, with the latter being the domi-
39. Id. at 69-73. But see WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY ...
AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 152 (1996). As Bennett et al.
argue:
When President Clinton took office the problem of illegal drugs had undergone a
sea change in just a little more than a decade. Instead of directing measured
steps to address the residual aspects of the drug problem, the president and mem-
bers of his administration immediately began undermining anti-drug efforts on a
variety of fronts.
Id.
40. E.g., TONRY, supra note 21, at 104-15. As Tonry argues:
The War on Drugs and the set of harsh crime-control policies in which it was
enmeshed were launched to achieve political, not policy, objectives, and it is the
adoption for political purposes of policies with foreseeable disparate impacts, the
use of disadvantaged black Americans as a means to the achievement of politi-
cians' electoral ends, that must in the end be justified, and cannot.
Id. at 123.
41. Cf Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13 & 20, 1999, at 30,
34 (making a similar argument concerning the special "tax" minorities pay in the context
of racial profiling). Kennedy argues that while the benefits of effective policing via fre-
quent (and sometimes unjustified) traffic stops pass to the general population, the per-
sonal costs of such stops are inordinately suffered by minorities, who are often unjustifiably
accosted due to racial profiling. Id.; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW
159 (1997). Kennedy remarks:
[A] young black man selected for questioning by police as he alights from an
airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of racial tax for the war against
drugs that whites and other groups escape. That tax is the cost of being subjected
to greater scrutiny than others.
Id.
42. Feldman, supra note 8, at 203-08. But cf Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution
Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L.
REv. 273 (1996).
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nant grounds for deportation. This relative change in the attention
paid by Congress to the issue of noncitizen criminal activity is consis-
tent with general trends in national immigration enforcement policy
focus. From 1908 to 1980, approximately forty-eight thousand aliens
were deported for criminal violations, but during just the decade of
the 1980s, over thirty thousand alien removals were made on the basis
of criminal or narcotics violations.44 During this period, a swell of
public concern over alien criminal activity developed, with both the
media and politicians stressing the importance of the "criminal-alien
problem" and arguing that the INS was not satisfactorily handling the
situation, in part, due to lack of resources.45 In the mid-1980s, Con-
gress solicited a series of reports on criminal aliens and, based on this
information, began to pass legislation to address the issue.46
A. Development of the "Aggravated Felon"
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control
Act,4 7 which provided for expedited deportation of criminal aliens by
the Attorney General,4" along with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,49 which
required the INS to begin pilot programs designed to coordinate the
efforts of the INS and local enforcement entities on drug offense cases
involving noncitizens.5 ° However, it was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 (the 1988 Act)5" that introduced the aggravated felony nomen-
clature to the INA and had the biggest impact on criminal-alien en-
forcement, affecting the deportation, detention, and readmission of
43. Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools
in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1064 (2002).
44. Id. at 1063 (citing 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 187 tbl.67-68).
45. Shuck & Williams, supra note 5, at 425-27.
46. See id. at 427-33 (explaining that the "immigration provisions of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 foreshadowed five years of legislative and administrative concern with
the criminal-alien problem"); see also Feldman, supra note 8, at 204-05 & nn.21-22 (detail-
ing the substance and impact of the report of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy).
47. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
48. Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 3445 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(i)).
49. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered titles
of the U.S.C.).
50. Id. § 1751(d), 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to 3207-49 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(e)).
51. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).
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noncitizens convicted of offenses falling into the new classification of
aggravated felonies.52 The 1988 Act stated:
The term "aggravated felony" means murder, any drug traf-
ficking crime as defined in section 924(c) (2) of title 18,
United States Code, or any illicit trafficking in any firearms
or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title,
or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act, com-
mitted within the United States."
The 1988 Act incorporated the definition of "drug trafficking,"
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2), which the 1988 Act amended to
state:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "drug trafficking
crime" means any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Sub-
stances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901
et seq.). 54
The implementation of the 1988 Act immediately yielded confusion
over whether its aggravated felony provisions applied to state drug of-
fenses committed by noncitizens. 55 In 1990, the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) addressed this issue. In In re Barrett5 6 the BIA held
that the definition of "drug trafficking crime" in § 924(c) (2), as incor-
porated into the INA by § l101 (a) (43), encompasses state as well as
federal crimes if the state conviction is analogous to a felony offense
under federal law.57
52. Id. §§ 7341-7349, 102 Stat. at 4469-73; see also Paxton v. INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1265
(E.D. Mich. 1990) ("Within the past few years, Congress has mounted a tremendous assault
on the prevalence of drugs in today's society. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 .. . pro-
vides stricter mechanisms for attacking the country's drug problem, including the classifi-
cation of drug trafficking as an aggravated felony.").
53. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469-70.
54. Id. § 6212, 102 Stat. at 4360. Before the 1988 Act, the definition under § 924(c) (2)
provided the following: "[flor purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking
crime' means any felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution, manufacture,
or importation of any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802))." Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 104(a)(2)(F), 100 Stat. 449, 457 (1986).
55. See, e.g., Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (consider-
ing one of the first challenges to § 924(c) (2) concerning its applicability to state
convictions).
56. 20 I. & N. Dec. 171 (B.I.A. 1990).
57. Id. at 177-78.
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In the Immigration Act of 1990 (the 1990 Act), 58 Congress at-
tempted to clarify its position by passing legislation intended to codify
the BIA's holding in Barrett. The House Judiciary Committee Report
provides insight on the proposed function of the amendment:
Current law clearly renders an alien convicted of a Federal
drug trafficking offense an aggravated felon. It has been less
clear whether a state drug trafficking conviction brings the
same result, although the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Matter of Barrett (March 6, 1990) has recently ruled that it
does. Because the Committee concurs with the recent deci-
sion of the Board of Immigration Appeals and wishes to end
further litigation on this issue, section 1501 of H.R. 5269
specifies that drug trafficking (and firearms/destructive de-
vice trafficking) is an aggravated felony whether or not the
conviction occurred in state or Federal Court.59
The 1990 Act's addendum to the aggravated felon provisions of 8
U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) explicitly stated that the "term [aggravated fel-
ony] applies to offenses described in the previous sentence whether in
violation of Federal or State law."6°
In 1992, the BIA shored up any remaining confusion concerning
the applicability of the aggravated felony provisions to state drug of-
fenses, holding in In re Davis6" that a state drug conviction is an aggra-
vated felony if it: (1) is a felony under state law and involves illicit
trafficking (i.e., unlawful trading or dealing) in any controlled sub-
stance, or (2) is a drug trafficking crime that is analogous to a felony
offense under one of the three statutes enumerated in § 924(c) (2).62
It is the latter portion of the Davis holding, concerning the applicabil-
ity of aggravated felony treatment to drug trafficking crimes (which
do not actually require an unlawful trading or dealing element-mere
possession will suffice),6 that has proven to be controversial. While
the BIA in Davis was careful to emphasize its position that analogous
felonies (for § 924(c) (2) purposes) involved only offenses where the
maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559),64 not all of the federal courts have agreed with this
interpretation.
58. Pub. L. 100-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
59. H.R. REP. No. 101-681, pt. 1, at 147 (1990).
60. Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048.
61. 20 I. & N. Dec. 536 (B.I.A. 1992).
62. Id. at 543.
63. Id. at 543-44.
64. Id. at 543.
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In creating this new classification scheme of aggravated felonies
under INA § 1101(a) (43), subsequent implementation and interpre-
tation has triggered contention concerning three discrete legal con-
texts. The first context involves a substantive legal classification of the
types of crimes defined as aggravated felonies, which grants certain
criminal activity special status and creates a distinctive subset of of-
fenses. The other two contexts involve sentencing enhancement for
noncitizens under the federal sentencing guidelines and immigration
consequences for drug trafficking offenses under the INA.
1. Substantive Context.-In the substantive legal context, INA
§1101(a)(43) includes twenty-one subcategories of possible aggra-
vated felony offenses.65 In a few of these subcategories the statute lists
specific offenses, such as "murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor"
'66
and "owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution
business,"67 without reference to any other statutory authority. How-
ever, most of the offenses refer to other provisions of the U.S. Code
and require the examination and interpretation of other chapters to
find the meaning of "aggravated felony" in a particular instance. For
example, in order to determine if an offense is a "crime of violence"
under § 1101 (a) (43) (F) and thus an aggravated felony for immigra-
tion purposes, a court must examine 18 U.S.C. § 16, which defines a
"crime of violence" as an offense that involves "the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another" and any other felony offense that "involves a substantial risk
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U). These offenses include: murder, rape, or sexual
abuse of a minor; illicit trafficking in controlled substances, including drug trafficking
crimes; trafficking in firearms, destructive devices, or explosive materials; money launder-
ing or unlawful property transactions over $10,000; other explosive material and firearm
offenses; crimes of violence punishable by at least one year's imprisonment; theft or bur-
glary punishable by at least one year's imprisonment; offenses relating to demanding or
receiving ransom; child pornography; racketeering and gambling offenses punishable by at
least one year's imprisonment; offenses relating to prostitution, involuntary servitude, and
trafficking in persons; disclosing classified information, sabotage, treason, and disclosing
undercover intelligence agent information; offenses involving fraud where loss exceeds
$10,000, and tax evasion involving over $10,000; offenses involved in alien smuggling; cer-
tain offenses described in 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) or § 1326 committed by aliens previously
deported on the basis of an aggravated felony; document and passport fraud; failure to
appear by a defendant for an offense punishable by at least five years' imprisonment; of-
fenses relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery or trafficking in vehicles;
offenses involving obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness punishable by at
least one year's imprisonment; failure to appear in court on a criminal felony for which the
possible punishment is at least two years; and attempt or conspiracies to commit any of the
aforementioned crimes. Id.
66. Id. § I101(a) (43) (A).
67. Id. § I101(a)(43) (K) (i).
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that physical force... may be used."68 However, § 1101 (a) (43) (F) fur-
ther confines this category by requiring that the crime of violence
carry a minimum prison term at least of one year.69
In determining whether a criminal act achieves the status of ag-
gravated felony, in the substantive context, courts have looked at sev-
eral sources. Some courts have referenced common-law meanings,
the plain language of the underlying criminal statutes, and the Model
Penal Code to define the offense.7 ° They may also look to guidance
from the state laws when the crime arises from state convictions.7 At
other times, courts have looked to the language of § 1101 itself, re-
gardless of state law, to determine if an action constitutes an aggra-
vated felony.72 However, the classification of a conviction as an
aggravated felony has created considerable disagreement among the
circuits, leading to significantly different outcomes regarding some
types of crimes. For instance, a split has developed over whether or
not driving-while-impaired convictions constitute aggravated felonies
as crimes of violence under § 1101 (a) (43) (F). 73
2. Sentencing Context.-In the sentencing context, the federal
sentencing guidelines incorporate the INA § 1101 (a) (43) definition
of "aggravated felony" (which, in turn, incorporates the § 924(c) (2)
definition of "drug trafficking"), in the determination of offense-level
enhancement for noncitizens convicted of unlawfully entering or re-
maining in the United States.74 In instances in which the offense at
issue is a felony under both state and federal law, it is clear that the
offense constitutes a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c) (2), and
hence, an aggravated felony under INA § 1101(a) (43), for sentence
enhancement purposes.75 There is support from at least two circuits
for the proposition that a state drug misdemeanor can qualify as an
68. See id. § 1101(a) (43) (F) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 16).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1204-08 (9th Cir. 2002)
(examining the methodologies available to determine whether the theft of a twelve-pack of
beer and a pack of cigarettes is an aggravated felony under § 1101 (a) (43) (G)).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1206-08.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding a battery offense to be an aggravated felony under § 1101(a) (43) (F) because it
warranted at least a year of imprisonment, even though the offense was classified as a
gross misdemeanor" under state law).
73. See Rah, supra note 11, at 2126-35 (discussing the varying approaches employed by
the circuits to determine whether DAI convictions are aggravated felonies within the pur-
view of § 1101 (a) (43) (F)).
74. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1) (C),
Application Note 3 (2004).
75. THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 795 (2002).
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aggravated felony if it would also be a federal felony.76 There is also
support, from a majority of the circuits that have ruled on the issue,
for the proposition that state felony drug offenses that would be only
misdemeanors under federal law qualify as drug trafficking offenses
and, thus, are aggravated felonies for sentencing purposes.
77
3. Immigration Context.-In the immigration context, a determi-
nation of aggravated felon status under INA § 1101 (a) (43) can trigger
a litany of adverse collateral consequences, including mandatory de-
portation 7 detention without bond, 79 and ineligibility for discretion-
ary relief from deportation,8 0 among others. As in the sentencing
context, there is consensus favoring aggravated felony status in situa-
tions in which the offense at hand is a felony under both state and
federal law. The BIA suggested early on, in In re Davis, that a state
misdemeanor that is analogous to a federal felony could constitute an
aggravated felony in the immigration context,81 and there is some au-
thority supporting this position. 2 The primary point of contention,
76. Id. at 795 n.69 (citing United States v. Ramos-Garcia, 95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Vasquez-Balandran, 76 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Diaz-
Bonilla, 65 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 85-86
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a state misdemeanor could be a hypothetical federal felony
for sentence enhancement purposes). But see United States v. Gomez-Oritz, 62 F. Supp. 2d
508, 509 (D.R.I. 1999) (holding that a state misdemeanor cannot be an aggravated felony
although it would have been a felony under federal law).
77. See HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 75, at 795 n.70 (citing United States v. Ibarra-
Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361
(1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Olvera-
Cervantes, 960 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d
142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a state felony that would only be a federal misde-
meanor is an aggravated felony); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th
Cir. 1996) (adopting the state classification rule, although the classification at issue de-
fined felonies as being punishable by more than a year of imprisonment). But cf United
States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that courts must
look at the penalty authorized for a particular crime, as opposed to the state's classification
of the offense, in determining whether an offense is a felony).
78. U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii).
79. Id. § 1226(c).
80. Id. § 1182(h).
81. In re Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 543 (B.I.A. 1992).
82. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311 n.12 (3d Cir. 2002) (cautioning that ap-
propriate formalities and procedural protections must be followed before misdemeanors
can stand as hypothetical federal felonies); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130, 136-37 (3d
Cir. 2001) (analyzing the state misdemeanor in question under the hypothetical federal
felony analysis but expressing doubts about the validity of such an analysis); see also Cope-
land v. Ashcroft, 246 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that state misdemean-
ors could stand as hypothetical federal felonies and yield an aggravated felony finding);
United States v. Graham, 927 F. Supp. 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 169 F.3d 787 (3d
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however, is whether drug offenses that are classified by the state as
felonies, but would not be felonies under federal law, are appropri-
ately considered as felonies for purposes of determining aggravated
felon status under the INA. In the immigration context, a majority
position has not been reached on this issue and most of the circuits
have not yet established authoritative precedent adopting any rule or
interpretation on what constitutes a felony for determining aggra-
vated felony status." As we discuss in more detail, infra, the BIA has
recently changed its position on this issue, now holding that state drug
offenses classified by the state as felonies can qualify as aggravated
felonies under the INA even when the offense is not analogous to a
federal felony.84
B. Competing Perspectives on the Meaning of "Felony" in State Drug
Offense Cases Under § 924(c)(2)
Three primary competing perspectives on the application of the
aggravated felony provisions, by way of § 924(c) (2), to state drug of-
fenses have emerged in the federal courts: the hypothetical federal
felony approach, the state labeling or classification approach, and the
state substantive felony approach. In evaluating these three ap-
proaches, we are careful to identify the context (sentencing vs. immi-
gration) of the holdings of the cases examined. However, we have
observed a certain degree of confluence between the sentencing and
immigration contexts in courts' analyses of competing interpretations
of the aggravated felony provisions. It is likely that courts assessing
Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant's misdemeanor state drug possession conviction
qualified as a hypothetical federal felony in determining defendant's status as an aggra-
vated felon). But see In reSantos-Lopez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 419, 421-22 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding
that a state's classification of a criminal conviction as a misdemeanor or felony is the rele-
vant inquiry in deciding whether the crime is a felony resulting in aggravated felon status);
In re Elgendi, 23 I. & N. Dec. 515, 519-20 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding that state misdemeanors
are not felonies for determining aggravated felony status).
83. By "authoritative precedent" we mean a published decision by a U.S. court of ap-
peals deciding a case dealing with immigration consequences under the INA (as opposed
to dealing with interpretations INA § 1101 (a) (43) for sentencing enhancement purposes),
in which an interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions of INA § 1101 (a) (43) as
applied to state felonies that would not be federal felonies is offered. While a number of
circuits have published U.S. district court decisions and unpublished court of appeals deci-
sions dealing with this matter, our review of the case law indicates that only the Second,
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have established authoritative precedent on this matter.
Some circuits have effectively dodged answering the question by deciding cases on alterna-
tive or multiple grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403, 406 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding that defendant's offense was an aggravated felony because it was a felony
under both state and federal law).
84. In reYanez-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 390, 398 (B.I.A. 2002); In reSantos-Lopez, 23 I. &
N. Dec. 419, 420-22 (B.I.A. 2002); Elgendi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 520.
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the competing perspectives will continue to intersperse both lines of
precedent in formulating a doctrinal matrix and deciding cases, re-
gardless of the legal context (sentencing vs. immigration) of the case
at bar.
1. Hypothetical Federal Felony Perspective.-The first view follows
the lead of the BIA's Davis/Barrett rule and holds that state drug of-
fenses that are delineated as felonies under state law must be analo-
gous to a federal felony offense under the Controlled Substances Act,
the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act in order to qualify as an aggravated fel-
ony.8 5 The Second, 6 Third, 7 and Ninth88 Circuit Courts of Appeals
have adopted this interpretation for the immigration context,89 how-
ever, no circuit has yet chosen this path for sentencing enhancement.
This view emphasizes the need for national uniformity in the applica-
tion of immigration laws9° and argues that, in light of its legislative
history and statutory context, § 924(c) (2)'s use of the term "felony" is
properly understood as meaning an offense that is punishable as a
felony under federal law.91
2. State Classification or Label Perspective.-The second approach
holds that state drug offenses that are classified or labeled as felonies
by the relevant state properly qualify as drug trafficking crimes under
§ 924(c) (2) and, therefore, aggravated felonies under INA
§ 1101(a) (43). In the sentencing context, this view arguably com-
85. Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 54243; In re Barrett, 20 I. & N. Dec. 171, 177-78 (B.I.A.
1990).
86. Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996). In Aguirre, in deference to the BIA's
decision in In reL-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89 (B.I.A. 1995), and citing the need for "nationwide
uniformity" on such cases, the Second Circuit overruled its prior decision in Jenkins v. INS,
32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), which had used the state classification rule. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at
317-18.
87. Gerbier, 280 F.3d 297. The Third Circuit has not yet addressed the aggravated fel-
ony issue in the sentencing context. Id. at 299.
88. Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuits with regard to aggravated felonies in
the immigration context, based largely on the need for uniformity in immigration law. Id.
at 912-14; see also United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004) (reaf-
firming the court's holding in Cazarez-Gutierrez).
89. The Sixth Circuit has also utilized this analysis in at least one case, although it was
clear not to establish the hypothetical felony rationale as the binding scheme for analysis.
Without specifically deciding which rationale to use, in Garcia-Echaverria v. United States, the
court found that, in the immigration context, the petitioner failed to meet his burden
under the more lenient approach adopted in Gerbier, and upheld the denial of the defen-
dant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 376 F.3d 507, 512-14 (6th Cir. 2004).
90. E.g., Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 311-12.
91. Id. at 308-11.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64:875
mands a majority of the circuits that have ruled on the issue.9 2 How-
ever, few circuits have ruled on the issue in the immigration context
in published opinions, and our review of the cases indicates that, of
those circuits that have ruled on the issue, only the Fifth Circuit has
unequivocally chosen the state classification perspective.93
3. State Substantive Felony Perspective.-The third perspective on
the treatment of state drug offenses under the aggravated felony pro-
visions holds that an offense qualifies as a felony, and consequently as
a drug trafficking offense under § 924(c) (2), if the relevant state
deems the offense as punishable by more than a year's imprisonment.
Thus, this perspective focuses on the substantive nature of the offense
and the punishment designated for it. This approach was first
adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and then only for sen-
tencing enhancement purposes. 94 The Ninth Circuit has reasoned
that the statutory context of § 924(c) (2) and Congress's long-standing
92. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 2000) (re-
viewing other circuits that have reviewed the issue in the sentencing context and conclud-
ing that they have all adopted the state classification perspective). However, this
observation may not be as straightforward as Ibarra-Galindo and the other courts that have
decreed this to be the majority position would suggest. For instance, Ibarra-Galindo asserts
that the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the state
classification rule. Id. However, in a number of the cases cited by Ibarra-Galindo, the courts
had actually decided that a state felony that was punishable for more than a year qualified
as an aggravated felony. See United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that a state drug offense yielding a five year prison sentence was an aggra-
vated felony under § 924(c) (2)); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th
Cir. 1996) (finding that the defendant's drug offense was an aggravated felony because
under New York law any criminal offense punishable by more than one year is a felony);
United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361, 365 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that a Rhode
Island felony that was punishable by up to three years' imprisonment was an aggravated
felony).
These courts were not required to directly rule on the definition of felony, since the
offenses at issue were both classified as felonies and also were punishable for more than a
year. See United States v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d 697, 702-03 n.32 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating
that the definition of "felony" in determining aggravated felony status was a case of first
impression in the circuit, having not been directly decided by Hinojosa-Lopez). The state
drug offenses in these cases would also qualify as aggravated felonies under the state sub-
stantive felony perspective, discussed in more detail infra, because they involve a sentence
of over a year of incarceration. Even the hypothetical federal felony perspective typically
invokes the 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) definition of "felony," which requires that an offense be
punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5). One is left to
wonder if these courts would have reached the same conclusions if the offenses at issue
had involved punishments more commonly associated with misdemeanors (i.e., a year or
less of imprisonment). On balance, the proposition that such courts have unequivocally
adopted the state classification rule appears tenuous at best.
93. United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001).
94. United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002). The Sixth
Circuit recently followed suit. Liao v. Rabbett, 398 F.3d 389, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005).
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tradition of equating a felony with more than a year's imprisonment
strongly suggest that state labels or classifications of drug offenses
should yield to the level of punishment associated with an offense in
determining whether the offense constitutes an aggravated felony.
9 5
While only one of the other circuits has formally adopted this perspec-
tive in a published opinion,9 6 there is some evidence that support for
the substantive state felony approach exists in some of the circuits that
have not yet authoritatively addressed the issue.
97
4. The BIA's Position.-In 2002, in In re Yanez-Garcia, the BLA
abandoned its longstanding Davis/Barrett rule, which had held that
state drug felonies (or misdemeanors) must be analogous to federal
felonies in order to qualify as aggravated felonies under § 924(c) (2)
and INA § 1101(a)(43) (i.e., the hypothetical federal felony rule). 8
The position set forth by the BIA in Yanez-Garcia is that it will follow
the rule adopted by the relevant circuit in deciding whether a state
felony constitutes an aggravated felony for collateral immigration con-
sequences, and in those circuits that have not ruled on the issue, it will
follow the position taken by the majority of the circuits in sentencing
enhancement cases-the state classification perspective.
99
However, this procedure has proven to be less than straightfor-
ward in practice. In a case arising in the jurisdiction of the Second
Circuit, decided just months after Yanez-Garcia, the BIA abandoned
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in Aguirre v. INS, in
which the court had adopted the hypothetical federal felony rule for
immigration cases,' 00 and instead applied the Second Circuit's ap-
proach for sentencing enhancement cases-the state classification
rule.' The BIA reasoned that the Second Circuit's rationale for
95. United States v. Ballesteros-Ruiz, 319 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2002); Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904-
05. But see Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting, at
least in dicta, that the power of sentencing is a state power and that uniformity is not
required across states as it is in the immigration context).
96. Liao, 398 F.3d at 395-96.
97. See Navarro-Macias v. INS, 16 Fed. Appx. 468, 2001 WL 690504, at *2, *3 (7th Cir.
2001) (unpublished opinion emphasizing that the defendant's drug offense was punisha-
ble by more than a year of imprisonment); Shurney v. INS, 201 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (deportation case holding that a felony under § 924(c) (2) is an offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year).
98. 23 1. & N. Dec. 390, 396-97 (B.I.A. 2002).
99. Id. at 396-98.
100. 79 F.3d 315, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1996).
101. In re Elgendi, 23 I. & N. Dec. 515, 517-20 (B.I.A. 2002). The Second Circuit had
previously adopted the majority approach in a sentencing context case. See United States v.
Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
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adopting different rules for the immigration and sentencing con-
texts-deferring to the BIA's former rule in order to attain a nation-
wide uniformity in the application of immigration laws-was no
longer feasible, therefore, the circuit majority sentencing approach
was essentially the "favored construction" in the Second Circuit." 2 It
remains to be seen if the BIA will apply similar logic in cases arising
under the jurisdiction of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals-the only remaining circuits that have explicitly rejected the
state classification perspective rule for immigration cases.
III. WHEN "FELONY" MEANs AN AGGRAVATED FELONY
The previously outlined escalation in federal legislative and en-
forcement attention to narcotics and alien criminals in recent decades
essentially extends the policymaking onus to the federal judiciary.'
The manner in which the federal courts interpret and apply the law in
the cases that are brought before them can significantly influence the
direction and character of national criminal justice and immigration
policy. In short, federal courts are important institutional actors in
the politics of shaping national public policy and, more generally, the
direction of American life. However, in shaping national immigration
policy in the context of the war on drugs, the U.S. courts of appeals
have reached an impasse. A parting of ways has arisen concerning an
important statutory interpretation under the INA. In deciding what
drug offenses are appropriately considered drug trafficking offenses,
and hence, aggravated felonies under the INA, the courts of appeals
define both the future of national immigration policy as well as the
fortunes of thousands of immigrants. We argue below that the state
classification perspective, embraced by a number of the circuits and
recently adopted by the BIA in Yanez-Garcia, fails to properly interpret
the INA's aggravated felony provisions and has detrimental implica-
tions for American immigration policy.
102. Elgendi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 518-19.
103. There is evidence to suggest that the escalation of the war on drugs extended to
judicial policymaking. During the height of the war on drugs, average sentences for drug
offenses in the U.S. district courts increased from 54.6 months in 1982 to 82.2 months in
1992. See 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 34, at 495 tbl.5.23. Of course, this increase, in
part, may reflect the impact of federal legislation on sentencing, especially congressional
inroads on narcotics offenses. Still, the 50% increase in sentencing length over the time
frame leads us to believe that there was some change in judicial policymaking in drug
cases.
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A. Plain Meaning and the Statutory Context of "Felony"
In examining any statute, one must always look first to the plain
or established meaning of the words used." °4 If the words themselves
are unambiguous, the reviewing court merely applies that plain mean-
ing without the need for further interpretation. Although there has
been conflict over the legal meaning of "aggravated felony," its plain
meaning appears unambiguous from the common usage of the two
words themselves. This plain meaning also contradicts the inclusion
of misdemeanors or other offenses that are not commonly deemed
felonies under the law. As one court of appeals judge noted:
[I] t is quite clear that "aggravated felony" defines a subset of
the broader category "felony." Common sense and standard
English grammar dictate that when an adjective-such as
"aggravated"-modifies a noun-such as "felony"-the com-
bination of the terms delineates a subset of the noun. One
would never suggest, for example, that by adding the adjec-
tive "blue" to the noun "car," one could be attempting to
define items that are not, in the first instance, cars.... [W] e
certainly should not presume that ["aggravated felonies"]
would include offenses that are not felonies at all.105
In interpreting the meaning of the aggravated felony provisions,
it is also appropriate to consider the use of the term "felony" within
the relevant statutory context. Section 1101(a) (43) of Title 8 defines
"aggravated felonies" to include "illicit trafficking in a controlled sub-
stance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug traffick-
ing crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18)," and adds that
"l[t] he term applies to an offense described.., whether in violation of
Federal or State law."' 6 In turn, "drug trafficking crime" is defined in
§ 924(c) (2) of title 18 as "any felony punishable under" the three ref-
erenced federal statutes.10 7 Hence, the point of contention lies in de-
termining exactly what offenses qualify as a "felony" under
§ 924(c) (2) and, more specifically, whether "felony" includes state
simple possession offenses that are classified as state felonies, but do
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (asserting that where
Congress has employed terms with a settled meaning, a court must infer that meaning in
the absence of an express indication to the contrary).
105. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (Straub, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the term "felony" is commonly understood to include crimes punishable by
prison terms of more than a year).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2).
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not require more than a year of incarceration and would only consti-
tute misdemeanors under federal law.
Courts adopting the state classification or label perspective have
charged that the hypothetical federal felony rule essentially endeavors
to rewrite § 924(c) (2) to read "any crime punishable as a felony under"
the referenced federal statutes. °8 However, the hypothetical federal
felony approach does not require an implicit rewriting of the statute,
but merely a sensible understanding of how the term "felony" is used
within § 924(c) (2). In interpreting a statute, the plain meaning of a
word or phrase cannot simply be considered in isolation, but rather,
meaning must be drawn from the statutory context in which it was
used."°9 Analysis of the entire text of § 924 reveals that where it
adopts state definitions or explanations to expand the scope of the
statute, it does so explicitly." ° In §924(e) (2) (A) (ii) and § 9 24(g) (3 ),
the statute deliberately incorporates state law drug offense definitions
to expand the scope of penalties for drug crimes and firearm of-
fenses.1"' However, it specifically declines to provide any such provi-
sions in § 924(c) (2) for state felonies that could not be punishable as
felonies under federal law. 1 2 Thus, the premise that a "felony" under
§ 924(c) (2) denotes an offense that is punishable as a felony under
federal law reflects a well-reasoned and informed reading of the term
"felony" that appropriately considers the overall structure of the stat-
ute and the relevant context of the term.
108. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (summa-
rizing the competing arguments on the interpretation of § 924(c) (2)).
109. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (stating that a fundamental
principle of statutory construction is that the meaning of words must be derived by their
use in the statute as a whole).
110. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief at 14-15, United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206
F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30090).
111. Id. Subparagraph (e) (2) (A) (ii) of § 924 states:
As used in this subsection . .. the term "serious drug offense" means ... (ii) an
offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with
intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section
102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more, is prescribed by law.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (A) (ii). Section 92 4 (g) (3) penalizes "[w] hoever, with the intent to
engage in conduct which... (3) violates any State law relating to any controlled substance
(as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) crosses
state lines to acquire a firearm." Id. § 92 4 (g) (3).
112. Unlike § 924(e) (2) (A) (ii) and § 92 4 (g) (3), § 924(c) (2) merely states, "[f]or pur-
poses of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking crime' means any felony punishable
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances
Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
(46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.)," without any reference to state laws. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2).
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B. Legislative History
The basic premise of the hypothetical federal felony perspec-
tive-that a "felony" denotes an offense that would constitute what is
commonly considered to be a felony under federal law-is supported
by the legislative history and purpose of the aggravated felony provi-
sions. Section 924(c) (2) of title 18 provides sentencing enhance-
ments for defendants in federal prosecutions who use or carry a
firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Prior to 1988, this sec-
tion defined "drug trafficking" as "any felony violation of Federal law
involving the distribution, manufacture, or importation of any con-
trolled substance." 1 3 In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress
amended this section to incorporate specific federal provisions con-
cerning narcotics offenses, with the definition of "drug trafficking" be-
ing changed to "any felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act. . . . the Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act.... or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act." '14 The amend-
ment was labeled a "clarification" '15 and certainly does not reflect the
intention of Congress to expand the definition of "drug trafficking
crimes."1 16
Further insight on the meaning of the term "felony" can be
found in the legislative history of INA § 1101(a)(43). Following the
enactment of the aggravated felony provisions in 1988, the BIA's deci-
sion in In re Barrett extended the parameters of the aggravated felony
provisions to state drug offenses, holding:
If Congress had wanted only convictions under the cited fed-
eral statutes to serve as aggravated felonies with respect to
drug offenses, it could have said so quite simply. Instead
Congress referred to felonies "punishable under" not "con-
victions obtained under" those statutes. As such, we find that
the definition of "drug trafficking crime" at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2), as incorporated into the Immigration and Na-
113. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2) (Supp. V 1982).
114. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6212, 102 Stat. 4181, 4360 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2)).
115. The title of § 6212 is "Clarification of Definition of Drug Trafficking Crimes in
Which Use or Carrying of Firearms and Armor Piercing Ammunition Is Prohibited." Id.
116. See United States v. Contreras, 895 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that
Congress had labeled the amendment a clarification and arguing that its intent was not to
broaden the definition of "drug trafficking crimes"); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft,
382 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that the intent behind § 6212 was to clarify
the scope of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 929(a), not to widen the scope of the definition); In
re L-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 89, 94 (B.I.A. 1995) (explaining that while the amended definition




tionality Act by section 101 (a) (43) of the Act, includes a state
conviction sufficiently analogous to a felony offense under the
Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Im-
port and Export Act, or the Maritime Drug Law Enforce-
ment Act."
7
Congress followed up the BIA's decision later that year by providing
an addendum to INA § 1101 (a) (43) that specified that a drug traffick-
ing offense is an aggravated felony whether or not the conviction oc-
curred in state or federal court."l 8
As noted previously in this Article, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee Report on the proposed amendment stated that the Committee
concurred with the BIA's decision in Barrett.' In 1992, in In re Davis,
the BIA elaborated on its interpretation of the statute, holding that:
We therefore clarify our holding in Matter of Barrett to specify
that for a finding of "drug trafficking crime" the alien's of-
fense must be a felony offense under one of the three stat-
utes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2), or it must be analogous
to a felony offense under one of the three statutes in section
924(c) (2).120
This statement of the BIA's position on the interpretation of "felony"
under § 924(c) (2) endured for more than a decade, and while Con-
gress continued to amend the aggravated felony provisions during
that time frame, 2 1 it conspicuously declined to demonstrate its disap-
proval by revising the statute to specify that the aggravated felony pro-
visions encompassed state felonies that were not punishable as federal
felonies.
In determining the meaning of "felony" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2), the appropriate definition is found within the same title.
Section 3559(a) of Title 18 sets forth the general classification of of-
fenses (as felonies or misdemeanors) for federal crimes and defines
"felony" as an offense that is punishable by more than one year in
117. In re Barrett, 20 1. & N. Dec. 171, 175 (B.I.A. 1990) (emphasis added).
118. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048.
119. H.R. REP. No. 101-681, pt. 1, at 147 (1990); see also Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297,
305 (3d Cir. 2002) (asserting that the legislative history of the amendment indicates that
Congress essentially codified the BIA's decision in Barrett).
120. In re Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 543 (B.I.A. 1992).
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (43) was amended three times from 1992-2002. Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat.
4305, 4320-22 (as amended); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627 to 3009-
628.
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prison. 22 Under this definition, state drug offenses would not consti-
tute aggravated felonies unless they were punishable under the rele-
vant federal law and would yield a term of imprisonment in excess of
one year. However, courts espousing the state classification or label
perspective do not use the definition provided by Title 18, but rather
make a strained reference to a definition provided within the Con-
trolled Substances Act of Title 21.123 Section 802(13) of the Con-
trolled Substances Act states that within the subchapter, "[t] he term
'felony' means any Federal or State offense classified by applicable
Federal or State law as a felony."'
24
The courts of appeals may embrace this definition in order to
provide a viable rationalization for using state classifications to deter-
mine federal aggravated felon status; however, by its own terms, § 802
limits the application of its definition of "felony" to that which is "used
in this subchapter. '"125 Hence, it is important to assess the use of this
definition within its own statutory parameters. Section 802(13)'s defi-
nition of "felony" is primarily used to activate sentence enhancements
for repeat offenders under Title 21 rather than to define substantive
crimes-the pertinent inquiry with regard to § 924(c) (2).126
C. Proper Interpretation of Statutory Definitions
If § 802(13) of the Controlled Substances Act is indeed the
proper authority for defining aggravated felonies in the drug offense
context, as the state classification perspective contends, using that stat-
ute in this manner conflicts with standard rules of statutory construc-
tion concerning intra-statutory conflict and inconsistency. First,
utilizing this meaning conflicts with a later part of the same section,
§ 802(44), which defines "felony drug offense" as "an offense that is
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of
the United States or of a State or foreign country." '27 Thus, the result
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 802(13) (2000).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re L-G-, 21 1. &
N. Dec. 89, 99 (B.I.A. 1995)). The Gerbier court went on to explain:
Indeed, there is only one instance under the Controlled Substances Act where
the term "felony" is used to describe a punishable offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)
(1999) (making it unlawful to use a communication facility "in committing or
causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony
under any provision of this subchapter"), and case law makes clear that only a
felony under federal law satisfies the felony element of this offense.
Id. at 310.
127. 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
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under the state classification perspective that a drug offense could be
a felony even if it was punishable by less than a year's incarceration is
plainly at odds with § 802's definition of "felony drug offense." 128
This conflict violates the well-established interpretive canon favoring
statutory consistency:
A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake
or error.12
9
To apply § 802(13) and define state felony drug offenses punisha-
ble by a year or less as aggravated felonies would make superfluous
§ 802(44), which includes the more-than-one-year imprisonment req-
uisite. Proper interpretation of the entire section involves the reason-
able inference that Congress intended to separate drug offenses from
other felonious criminal actions.130 A reading of § 802(13) to include
drug crimes as felonies merely by way of a state's delineation and with-
out regard to minimum punishments would ignore the congressional
language unambiguously written in the statute. At least one circuit
has arrived at a similar conclusion concerning the interpretation of
§ 802."l In United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the state classification perspective within the context of sentencing en-
hancement. 1 32 The Court held:
If the [state classification] position were correct, a drug of-
fense could be a felony (and therefore a "felony drug of-
fense") even if punishable by less than one year's
imprisonment-a result clearly inconsistent with the statute's
definition of "felony drug offense." Reading both definitions
together, we conclude that Congress intended the word "fel-
ony" to describe offenses punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment under applicable state or federal law.' 33
128. See United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 181-90
(6th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted). Singer cites over 150 cases in support of this statutory
canon, including cases at both federal and state levels. Id. at 181-92.
130. See 2A id. § 46:06, at 194 ("[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part
of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings
were intended.").
131. See Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904; see also United States v. Rios-Beltran, 361 F.3d
1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2004) (following the interpretation of "aggravated felony" as adopted
in Robles-Rodriguez).
132. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904.
133. Id. The court rested its conclusion on the principle that "[o]ne provision of a
statute should not be interpreted in a manner that renders other sections of the same
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As the Ninth Circuit found in the sentencing enhancement con-
text and as proper statutory interpretation dictates, the provisions in
§ 802 should be understood within the framework of the entire sec-
tion, requiring § 802(13) to be read in conjunction with § 802(44).
This requires the prerequisite of more than one year as the minimum
punishment for drug crimes to be defined as "aggravated felonies" as
used in the INA and as interpreted through the Controlled Sub-
stances Act.
Another interpretive canon is violated by ignoring § 802(44).
When specific definitions apply to specific terms within a statute, the
specific, rather than the general definitions, apply in those particular
situations.1 3 4 As has been noted, "[w]here there is inescapable con-
flict between general and specific terms or provisions of a statute, the
specific will prevail."' 3 5 Thus, in dealing with aggravated felonies con-
cerning drug crimes, such as INA § 1101 (a) (43) (B), the proper inter-
pretation of "felony" would be the more specific definition regarding
"felony drug offense" found in §802(44), rather than the more gen-
eral definition of "felony" written in §802(13). Therefore, even if
§ 802 is the proper section to refer to for INA definitions, the state
classification perspective remains at odds with the proper interpreta-
tion of the statute. In order to comply with the presumption that a
more specific provision controls a provision that is more general,1 36
the latter, and more specific definition found in § 802(44) applies
when defining aggravated drug felonies.
D. Additional Considerations
The appropriate interpretation and implementation of the aggra-
vated felony provisions of the INA involve not only the standard statu-
tory construction concerns outlined above, but also entail
consideration of broader matters of importance in immigration policy
and legal rights.
1. Lenity in the Interpretation of Laws Affecting Deportation.-The
state classification perspective also conflicts with the traditional Su-
preme Court precedent of resolving ambiguities in deportation stat-
utes in favor of the alien.1 3 7 The Court has held that:
statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous." Id. (quoting United States v. Fiorillo,
186 F.3d 1136, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)).
134. See, e.g., D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932).
135. 2A SINGER, supra note 129, § 46:05, at 177.
136. See 2A id. § 46:05, at 178-79.
137. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
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[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for
misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture
is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less gener-
ously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the
stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume
that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that
which is required by the narrowest of several possible mean-
ings of the words used.'3 8
This principle has been followed in recent contexts, 13 9 although some
contemporary cases may limit this approach. 4 0 Favoring aliens in am-
biguous statutes also follows the longstanding rule of lenity toward
criminal defendants under which the Court decides uncertainty in
criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.1 4 ' Several of the circuits
have applied this rule of lenity in the immigration context.' 42 Given
138. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citation omitted). This case dealt
with the INS's ability to deport an alien convicted of two murders. Id. at 8. The deporta-
tion statute in force at that time called for the deportation of an alien who was sentenced
more than once to a prison term of over one year for a crime involving moral turpitude,
but was not specific as to the time frame of when the two convictions or sentences had to
occur. Id at 7. Deportation procedures were initiated under the premise that the defen-
dant-alien was convicted and sentenced to two crimes of moral turpitude. Id. at 7-8. The
Court noted that the petitioner was convicted under two counts of one indictment, and
held that the two convictions could not for purposes of deportation occur within the same
trial, thus allowing the defendant-alien to avoid deportation. Id. at 8, 10.
139. E.g., INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128
(1964); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449 (noting, but not relying on, the "longstand-
ing principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien").
140. See, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1996) (distinguishing Errico
and finding a different result based on a subsequent statutory change by Congress); INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the major-
ity's "narrow, grudging construction" of the INA's provisions on political asylum, and citing
Erico, Costello, Fong Haw Tan, and Cardoza-Fonseca for the principle that ambiguities should
be resolved in favor of the alien).
141. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 34748 (1971); see also United States v. Koz-
minski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) ("The purposes underlying the rule of lenity [are] to
promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective
or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecu-
tors, and courts ...."). But see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (hold-
ing that the rule of lenity is not applicable when the statute is clear).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2002). In Simpson,
the Second Circuit held that the rule of lenity applies when interpreting the Sentencing
Guidelines for sentencing enhancements, even though in the particular case the court
held that the specific provision in question was not ambiguous and thus did not require
the application of the rule of lenity. Id. The court also noted that the Ninth, Eighth, and
Fourth Circuits have held that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing enhancement cases,
although the Seventh and Fifth Circuits have found the rule of lenity inapplicable to these
cases. Id. at 86.
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the harsh collateral immigration consequences that noncitizens face
in such situations, the rule of lenity is especially appropriate in these
cases. The state classification perspective, however, fails to fulfill the
spirit of this principle, allowing noncitizens to be deported under
state criminal statutes for crimes for which they could not be deported
if living in other states or if prosecuted under federal authority. As
the United States Supreme Court has previously noted, a statute that
trenches on this freedom should be construed narrowly,' 43 as opposed
to the more expansive interpretation dictated by the state classifica-
tion position. Following this historic principle leads to the conclusion
that a narrow interpretation of "aggravated felony" that favors the
noncitizen should apply.
2. Favoring Substance over Form in Defining Felonies.-The state
classification perspective further ignores the importance of the poten-
tial punishment of the crime rather than the mere labeling of the
offense. In numerous recent court of appeals cases, even in those cir-
cuits adopting the state classification perspective, courts have recog-
nized the traditional congressional definition of a "felony" as being a
crime punishable by more than one year. t44 Examining a crime's
punishment, rather than its classification, conforms to the principle
that the crime's seriousness is defined by its sanctions, rather than its
name alone.1 45 As one judge noted:
While Congress clearly intended to broaden the aggravated
felony category to include more criminal offenses, there is
no evidence to suggest that in doing so, Congress intended
to "break[ ] the time-honored line between felonies and mis-
demeanors" by including offenses punishable by one year's
imprisonment within that definition.146
143. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
144. See United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Con-
gress has a longstanding practice of equating the term 'felony' with offenses punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment."); United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167-
68 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[F]ederal law traditionally defines a felony as a crime punishable by
over one year's imprisonment. .. ."); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir.
1999) ("The one-year mark was used by Congress as early as 1865."); United States v. Page,
84 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 1996) (inferring an intent to incorporate the historical statutory
definition of a felony to define the term "felonious" as a crime punishable by imprison-
ment of over one year where it is left undefined in the Sentencing Guidelines).
145. See United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)).
146. United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2000) (Straub, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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An analogous instance demonstrating the importance of the pun-
ishment rather than the statutory label can be found in the Supreme
Court's decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury. 14 7 In Duncan v. Louisiana, the State of Louisiana denied the de-
fendant a jury trial based on the fact that the crimes alleged were only
classified as misdemeanors. 148 At the time, federal "petty offenses,"
where no jury trial was required, were classified as crimes with punish-
ments of less than six months imprisonment. t4 9 In determining
whether Louisiana was required to grant the defendant ajury trial, the
Supreme Court did not look at the label or classification of the crime
committed. Rather, the Court assessed the possible punishment for
the crime, which in Duncan's case was two years' imprisonment.150
Justice White, writing for the majority, asserted that "the penalty au-
thorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining
whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject
the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment. 151
The current debate over aggravated felonies for drug convictions
does not involve civil liberties as granted to citizens under the Bill of
Rights. However, the results of classifying a crime as an aggravated
felony may involve consequences for immigrants that are just as seri-
ous to them as violations of those rights granted in the Bill of
Rights.1 52 The Supreme Court's traditional emphasis on punishment,
rather than labels, coupled with its principle of deciding ambiguities
in favor of aliens, discussed supra, demonstrates that the state classifi-
cation perspective is inconsistent with historical jurisprudence.
3. Need for Uniformity.-Beyond the factors outlined above, the
state classification perspective further negates the longstanding goal
of uniformity within national immigration policy.' 53 The need for
uniformity was stressed by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, when
he argued that "the power over naturalization must 'necessarily be ex-
clusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
148. 391 U.S. 145, 146 (1968).
149. Id. at 161.
150. Id. at 162.
151. Id. at 159 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)).
152. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (noting that deportation is a
severe measure that infringes on the freedoms of aliens and that at times is akin to banish-
ment or exile).
153. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the Consti-
tution and notions of "fundamental fairness" support the policy of uniformity in the immi-
gration context); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2004).
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there could be no Uniform Rule.' ,1 54 As demonstrated in the exam-
ple between the laws of North Dakota and Montana provided at the
beginning of this Article, the current state classification regime over
aggravated felonies brings Hamilton's prophetic statement to life.
155
The goal of uniformity serves as an important factor in those circuits
that adopt the hypothetical felony rule in the deportation context.1
56
In Aguirre, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly expressed its
''concern to avoid disparate treatment of similarly situated aliens
under the immigration laws." '57 In Gerbier, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals emphasized the need for uniformity in immigration law,
noting:
[A]liens convicted of drug offenses in different states...
would be treated differently with respect to deportation and
cancellation of removal....
* This cannot be what Congress intended in establishing a
"uniform" immigration law....
In sum, a state drug conviction, for deportation purposes, constitutes
an "aggravated felony" if it is either a felony under state law and con-
tains a trafficking element, or would be punishable as a felony under
the federal Controlled Substances Act.
1 58
The United States Supreme Court has been inclined to favor uni-
formity in instances in which varying state criminal law definitions may
154. See Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 311 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
155. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text; see also Iris Bennett, Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated Felony" Convictions, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1696, 1720-26 (1999). Discussing a number of inconsistencies in state crimi-
nal laws, Bennett proposes a hypothetical case, based on actual facts, of a nineteen-year-old
male who has consensual sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. Id at 1721. In various
states, including New York, where the actual events took place, the nineteen-year-old could
be convicted of "sexual misconduct," which would constitute an aggravated felony. Id at
1722. However, in other states with lower ages of consent, such as Maryland, the nineteen-
year-old would not face state prosecution and thus could not be deported as an aggravated
felon. Id
156. See, e.g., Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 311-12; Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996)
(overruling the Second Circuit's prior precedent applying the state classification perspec-
tive and applying the hypothetical felony perspective because "the interests of nationwide
uniformity outweigh our adherence to Circuit precedent"). But see United States v. Pornes-
Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Aguirre, limiting the use of the
hypothetical felony rule to deportation cases, and holding that sentence enhancement
cases will continue to be decided under the state classification approach because the con-
cerns about uniformity do not exist in these cases).
157. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317.
158. Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 312 (footnote omitted). The Gerbier Court further determined
that "punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act" required the state con-
viction to be punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. Id. at 316.
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have federal sentencing consequences. 159 In Taylor v. United States,16 °
the Court had to determine the impact of prior state burglary convic-
tions for federal sentencing enhancements under the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).16' The Court reviewed the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals's determination that burglary, for
sentencing enhancement purposes, was defined "however a state
chooses to define it."1 6 2 In rejecting the Eighth Circuit's approach,
the Court noted the difficulties that occur when federal sentencing
statutes must rely on dissimilar state statutes, including the possibility
of unequal punishments for identical criminal conduct. 163 Instead of
allowing lower courts to merely rely on state law labeling of the prior
convictions as "burglaries," the Court provided a "generic definition"
of burglary'64 and held that lower courts must look not only at the fact
of a prior conviction but also the statutory definition of the offense
that was the basis of prior conviction.' 65 If the definition of the state
offense does not include the elements of the generic definition of
burglary as provided by the Supreme Court, the sentencing court may
need to examine other facts of the conviction, such as the charging
papers and jury instructions, to ensure that the necessary elements of
generic burglary are proven.'66 These measures appear necessary to
avoid unequal sentencing outcomes "based on exactly the same con-
duct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction hap-
pened to call that conduct 'burglary."" 67
159. Bennett, supra note 155, at 1731-32.
160. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
161. Id. at 577-78.
162. Id. at 579 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 864 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1989)).
163. Id. at 590-91. The Court noted one example of the problem between the Michigan
and California burglary statutes. Id. at 591. The California law includes such things as
"shoplifting" and taking items out of an automobile in a broad offense of "burglary," while
the Michigan statute classifies burglaries under several narrow categories. Id. This led the
Court to note that
a person imprudent enough to shoplift or steal from an automobile in California
would be found, under the Ninth Circuit's view, to have committed a burglary
constituting a "violent felony" for enhancement purposes-yet a person who did
so in Michigan might not. Without a clear indication that with the 1986 amend-
ment Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform cate-
gorical definitions to identify predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress's
omission of a definition of "burglary" in a way that leads to odd results of this
kind.
Id.
164. Id. at 599.
165. Id. at 602.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 591.
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Thus, it is evident that a reading of the aggravated felony provi-
sions within the state classification context adds significant sanctions
to some immigrants for merely committing the wrong crime in the
wrong state. 168  While the violation of any criminal law may be
deplorable and indeed deserving of punishment, the immigration
ramifications should be uniform and comply with a national policy
that treats all immigrants similarly in like situations. The hypothetical
federal felony perspective, whereby state criminal convictions must
meet uniform standards to be considered aggravated felonies, is the
best method for assuring that immigrants are treated equally under a
national immigration policy.
CONCLUSION
The war on drugs stands as one of the most ambitious govern-
ment policy campaigns in recent American history. Government ef-
forts to curtail the use and sale of illegal narcotics have been
manifested through public rhetoric by elite political actors, 6' legisla-
tion,1 7 ° and law enforcement and prosecutorial priorities. 17' The
courts have also played an important role in the war on drugs. Both
trial 172 and appellate1 73 courts have an important influence on the
direction of American public policy through their interpretation and
application of statutes and case precedent. In this Article, we have
outlined how government policymaking in the war on drugs has nega-
tively and inordinately impacted immigrants and, more specifically,
how judicial policymaking via statutory interpretation of the aggra-
vated felony provisions of the INA can have unwarranted and onerous
collateral consequences for noncitizen defendants in relatively minor
narcotics cases. The policy decisions of a number of the circuits and
the BIA have lead to an injudicious interpretation and implementa-
168. Similar arguments have been made concerning the current Justice Department's
policy of encouraging local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration laws.
This policy could lead to similar disparate treatment of similarly situated immigrants de-
pending on the level of aggressiveness of local authorities. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 965, 998-1003 (2004).
169. See generally WILLIAM N. ELWOOD, RHETORIC IN THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE TRIUMPHS
AND TRAGEDIES OF PUBLIC RELATIONS (1994).
170. See generally STEVEN R. BELENKO, DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA: A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY (2000).
171. See Whitford & Yates, supra note 2, at 998-99.
172. See Lynn Mather, The Fired Football Coach (Or, How Trial Courts Make Policy), in CON-
TEMPLATING COURTS 170, 173-75 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
173. SeeJEFFREV A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDI-
NAL MODEL REVISITED 6-12 (2002).
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tion of the aggravated felony provisions of the INA, and will continue
to yield unfair and inconsistent treatment of noncitizens in such cases.
If we consider the government's policy crusade against the illegal
use and sale of narcotics as a "war," then we may gain some valuable
policy insight by assessing the role of immigrants, minorities, and
lower socioeconomic classes in American wars more broadly. On the
home front, wars typically have both benefits and costs, and such ben-
efits and costs are not often distributed equally. For example, during
the Civil War, the Union's conscription policies, which allowed those
with enough money to "buy out" of the draft by paying a fee, unduly
favored the wealthy and disproportionately targeted immigrants.1 74
Discontent with the patent unfairness of these discriminatory draft
laws led members of New York City's working poor and immigrant
populations to engage in one of the most violent riots in American
history.175 By the final year of the Civil War, one out of every three
Union soldiers who enlisted was foreign born. 176
Such inequitable burden sharing by immigrants, ethnic minori-
ties, and the poor has been evident throughout American involve-
ment in wars. 177  In the American war on drugs, the general
174. See HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE UN-
DERWORLD 113 (1998); see also WILLIAM L. BURTON, MELTING POT SOLDIERS: THE UNION'S
ETHNIC REGIMENTS (1998) (chronicling Union attempts to recruit new immigrants). Bur-
ton provides a contemporary sketch of a scene in New York in which Union officials at-
tempt to enlist immigrants who have just arrived from the other side of the Atlantic. Id. at
198. His caption for the sketch reads "ENLISTING IRISH AND GERMAN IMMIGRANTS.
Union recruiters enticed immigrants literally right off the docks at New York's Castle Gar-
den, a practice that led to confederate charges that the Union employed foreign merce-
naries." Id.
175. ASBURY, supra note 174, at 113-57.
176. Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "With Malice Toward None; With Charity Toward All": Civil
War Pensions for Native and Foreign-Born Union Army Veterans, 11 TRANSNATIONAL L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1, 32 fig.5 (2001).
177. See, e.g., Jeanette Keith, The Politics of Southern Draft Resistance, 1917-1918: Class, Race,
and Conscription in the Rural South, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1335 (2001) (chronicling elitist draft
policies in World War I and the concomitant resistance to such conscription practices by
Southern minorities and poor whites); see also KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 138-39 (recount-
ing the mistreatment of people of Japanese ancestry during World War II in the name of
national security); cf David Card & Thomas Lemieux, Going to College to Avoid the Draft: The
Unintended Legacy of the Vietnam War, 91 AM. ECON. REv. 97 (2001) (describing the ability of
college students to avoid the draft through college deferment). The recent War in Iraq
has led to charges that the present "all volunteer" military system has disproportionately
drawn from historically disempowered groups. See Kevin Horrigan, Hired Guns, ST. Louis
DISPATCH, May 11, 2003, at B3 (noting that only one in fourteen military recruits has a
college degree), available at 2003 WL 76666618; see also Richard Cohen, Spread the Threat,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at A39 (outlining the controversy surrounding a proposed bill to
reinstate the draft and noting that African Americans' representation in the military is
nearly twice that of their representation in the general population), available at 2004 WL
93181824.
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population may have derived a benefit from governmental actions to
reduce the consumption and sale of illegal narcotics; however, it is
clear that traditionally disempowered groups (i.e., immigrants, ethnic
minorities, and the poor) have paid the "fee." ' Within the specific
context of the INA's aggravated felony provisions, the current position
of some circuits, imposing aggravated felon status on noncitizens
whose offenses are not equivalent to traditional federal standards for
felonies, distorts the underlying purpose and meaning of INA
§ 1101 (a) and stands to continue to cause unfair collateral immigra-
tion consequences for noncitizens who have been convicted of rela-
tively minor drug offenses.
178. See TONRY, supra note 21, at 123; see also KENNEDY, supra note 41. Kennedy posits
that one compelling theory of inordinate burden sharing in the drug war suggests:
[T]he war on drugs, although truly aimed against illicit narcotics, is conducted in
a fashion that is negligently indifferent to the war's collateral damage to blacks.
According to this theory, if the war on drugs did to white communities what it is
doing to black communities, white policymakers would long ago have called a
truce in order to pursue some other, less destructive course.
Id at 351.
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